Dr Emrys Shoemaker
Senior Director Advisory & Policy (Caribou Digital), Visiting Fellow (Global Governance Centre)

Dr Cristina Teleki
Postdoctoral Researcher (European Centre for Privacy and Cybersecurity), Visiting Fellow (Global Governance Centre) 

Synopsis : Geneva is being displaced as the center of multilateral governance. The governance of digital needs exactly the opposite.

Keywords: Governance; Digital; Brussels’ effect; EU; China; US. 

A recent article in Le Temps argues that Geneva can no longer claim to be a global digital beacon. This proposition is surprising taking into account the fact that only a few years ago Geneva was deemed a hub for Internet governance. Indeed, Geneva has historically hosted not only critical digital policy institutions and processes, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), but also the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that facilitates digital trade. We believe and attempt to show that the – perceived or otherwise – weakening role of Geneva in this context reflects changes in two interrelated processes: multilateralism and the governance of digital affairs. We describe aspects of this fragmenting multilateralism and make suggestions for how Geneva’s role can be strengthened.  

First, digitalisation is changing the practice and context of governance – both governance ‘through’ digital technology and the governance ‘of’ digital affairs. Digital technology is affecting the practice of governance in unprecedented ways, changing everything from the way public services are delivered to how governance is designed, managed, and delivered. Digital technology also changes the context in which governance takes place – for example, the rise of digital platforms and decline of independent mass media has been linked to a proliferation of mis- and disinformation, including AI-generated content and challenges to the critical infrastructure for accountability and democratic processes. In this dynamic and digitally-enhanced context, it is more difficult to defend and manage democratic values and processes, such as elections, public debate, human rights, and trust in government. Two well-known examples of the latter are the use of technology to influence the Brexit vote and the use of social media to spread health conspiracies during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Second, the process of digitalisation has changed the arrangement of power amongst states, the private sector, and civil society. These changes have been characterized by a period of self-regulation by the tech sector that led to the emergence of digital global giants, or – in the recent language chosen by the legislator of the European Union (EU) – gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are large technological companies that not only affect digital markets with their monopoly power, but also adjacent conventional markets. In addition, digital global giants have amassed important political and social power, directly or indirectly influencing elections, research, and agendas. Scholars point out how Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other platforms have repeatedly failed to remove dangerous disinformation on topics ranging from the COVID-19 pandemic to democratic elections. They also highlight the images of the January 6, 2021, insurrection at the US Capitol, which originated in a rampant social media-fuelled disinformation campaign about a stolen election. This challenges the governance ‘over’ digital and the path of digital transformation. 

Third, the narrative of these political and economic developments is often binary. On one end of the spectrum, techno-pessimists equal technological change with the end of humanity. On the other hand, techno-optimists preach technological change as a source of unquestionable prosperity and progress for everyone partaking in this process. 

In this context, governance work means making choices for generations to come. The United States (US), the EU, and China are pioneers in this digital governance landscape, capitalizing on the first-mover advantages. For other countries, regional, and local authorities, however, such positioning may be difficult due to internal reasons – such as lack of capacity to balance economic growth, innovation, and protection of fundamental rights – or external reasons – such as geopolitics.  Among many consequences arising from this regulatory dance, the governance gap, fragmentation, and regulatory colonialism may be the most significant. 

Firstly, there is a significant gap is emerging between the governance models adopted by the US, China, and the EU and the rest of the world. Moreover, competition between the three regulatory models adopted by the US, the EU, and China may present challenges to other states seeking to assert their own national interest and to exercise sovereignty over digital technologies. In addition, certain regulatory choices may be perceived as protectionism. For example, China develops its own software to shield domestic technology companies, while at the same time supporting the expansion of these companies abroad including through the Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road Initiatives. The US supports its own technology companies – largely through shaping international regulations over data sharing and IP, and a laissez-faire regulatory approach. While the EU doesn’t have globally significant digital technology companies, it has been at the forefront of developing and asserting standards and regulation, data-rights regimes, and competition policy. Finally, India has answered this regulatory puzzle by attempting to promote its own regulatory approach to digitalisation. Its advocacy for ‘digital public infrastructure’ through bodies such as the G20 and promotion of ‘India stack’ have been described as India’s ‘digital belt and road’ initiative and could be described as benefiting from its own ‘New Delhi-effect’. 

Efforts to govern digital affairs are also fragmented between various legal regimes. In October 2023, the US dropped long established positions on WTO negotiations around digital trade to allow room for domestic antitrust regulation against American companies, while also continuing the current open market, self-regulation approach. China has adopted a number of measures including an anti-monopoly campaign that involves numerous new laws and policy directives that together aim at reducing the monopoly of China’s tech giants Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. The EU seeks to establish itself in-between the US and China by moving towards a more participatory, ‘co-regulation’ approach. Such regulatory fragmentation is costly to all actors involved.  

Finally, this governance gap can lead to what is describe elsewhere as  ‘regulatory colonialism’. The governance frameworks established in the Global North are significant for the Global South. The so-called ‘Brussels effect’ for example, describes the global standard setting role of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In fact, the GDPR has implications for the rest of the world as it governs transactions and trade with the EU and it serves as a benchmark for domestic legislation in the Global South. While the EU’s rights-based regulatory approach emphasizes individual protection, there are growing concerns that globally dominant regulatory frameworks prevent some countries from developing their own definitions of data privacy that reflect their own unique social values and economic realities. For example, the chair of South Africa’s Information Regulator has said that South Africa’s concern to protect domestic small business that lack the budgets or know-how to follow complicated privacy rules would take priority over following standards created for others with deeper pockets to tackle potential abuse. The further fragmentation of standards, frameworks, and values increases the challenge for countries that lack the capacity to engage, limiting their efforts to govern technology as part of a rights-based, inclusive approach to digital transformation.  

A renewed discussion on governing digital affairs is necessary. Even as the fragmentation of digital governance challenges Geneva’s central position, its role in convening a neutral forum for both Global North and Global South stakeholders and abundant expertise and processes makes it the best place to build capacity for and with a variety of stakeholders. A new type of multilateralism – decentralized and Global South-oriented – can not only be imagined, but also operationalized using the existing visions, ambassadors, and institutions in Geneva.

We conclude with outlining a few steps that could help Geneva reassert its central position in digital governance. First, a mapping of all existing governance actors and efforts is needed. Second, the maps should be analysed to identify where strengths and critical gaps lie. Third, the maps and ensuing analysis should be used to develop mechanisms and competence to bridge the governance divide y. This could take the form of convening peer-based learning, as well as providing impartial expertise to support interested countries to develop their own expertise and strengthen their capacity to engage with dominant regulatory frameworks or to develop regulatory frameworks that reflect their own context, needs, culture and values. Finally, there is a need for an institutional platform for these efforts and from which to build a network and host relevant expertise. We believe that, by doing so, Geneva may lead the way towards a vibrant multilateral approach to digital governance.