Janelle Diller, Senior Research Fellow, Global Governance Centre, Graduate Institute
Keywords: United Nations, Gaza Peace Process, International Law
Recent United Nations (UN) authorization of the US-proposed Board of Peace (BoP) to implement a US-backed peace plan for Gaza has provoked significant international debate. Resolution 2803 adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC) in November 2025 (Res. 2803) vividly depicts the challenges of implementing the UN mandate by use of co-regulatory initiatives in the context of increasing geo-political and economic conflicts among nations.
In general, co-regulatory initiatives offer opportunities for the UN to leverage its impact with the distinctive influence and resources of willing actors to achieve aims of mutual interest. However, the co-regulatory design must be fit for purpose and contain features essential to the mandate and rules of the UN that shape its central role in global governance (“UN governance”). Two such features are especially critical to the UN-BoP initiative created by Res. 2803. First, the UN should insist on building sufficient safeguards into such initiatives to ensure that their processes and outcomes are consistent with relevant UN Charter principles and rules of international law. Second, to be effective, such UN co-regulatory initiatives must be required to operate coherently in purpose and methods with related UN action within the broader UN governance sphere.
As explained below, the UN-BoP initiative falls short on both counts (see “Two Organs, Two Tracks”). First, Res. 2803 imposes few safeguards or monitoring measures to help ensure consistency of the BoP actors with the duties of the UN and its Member States under the Charter and international law. Second, Res. 2803 does not require the UN.-BoP initiative to operate coherently within the broader system of UN policies and related action on Palestine – and notably ignores the widely-supported New York Declaration on the Question of Palestine (New York Declaration) adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) two months which is being implemented as a separate UN initiative in the context of the Global Alliance for implementation of the two-State solution (“Global Alliance”), an independent coalition of states, international organizations, and other stakeholders (UN-Global Alliance initiative).
Further examination below reveals an urgent need to address the growing legal and operational risks of the current situation (see “Unsettled Lines of Legal Responsibility”). Serious legal uncertainty surrounds the status and legitimacy of the BoP under international and US law which in turn affects who may be held directly responsible for harm attributable to the UN-BoP initiative and what law applies. In such cases, the examination finds that the states acting within the BoP as well as the UN itself may be held legally responsible under international law for harm attributable to them.
As suggested below, the current pursuit of two disjointed initiatives risks aggravating the dangerous and dire situation In Palestine, and the UN and UN Member states should take urgent corrective action to meet their responsibilities (see section “At a Crossroads: Options Ahead”). The suggested measures involve action by the UNSC, UNGA, UN Secretary General (UNSG) and UN Member states to embed robust safeguards into the UN-BoP initiative and to ensure coherent coordination of the two UN co-regulatory initiatives. With resolve, the UN and its Member states can ensure a joined-up coherent approach for international peace and security for Palestine, Israel and the region achieved through action in conformity with the rules of the UN and relevant international law.
Two Organs, Two Tracks
Both the UN-Global Alliance initiative and the UN-BoP initiative address many of the same areas of effort – including peace-building, humanitarian aid and redevelopment – but the two frameworks differ significantly in the outcomes they seek for Palestine. The UNGA’s New York Declaration and action plan aims to achieve the long-established UN commitments to Palestinian self-determination, statehood, and the Two-State solution. In contrast, Res. 2803 and the annexed US-backed Comprehensive Plan fail to directly commit to those core UN policies for resolution of the Palestinian question. The absence of such policies is even more striking in light of the UNSC’s earlier affirmation in its Resolution 2334 (2016) and the ICJ’s repeated view that the UN and its Member states are required to support those outcomes under the UN Charter and international law.
The two initiatives differ markedly in their process and methods, too. The New York Declaration’s action plan is advancing in an inclusive and transparent context with the Global Alliance. More than 90 states and international organizations – and the Palestinian Authority (PA) – have participated in 10 meetings held so far by the UN-Global Alliance initiative since the Declaration’s adoption last year. In contrast, Res. 2803 relies on a stand-alone system run by the (then-future) US-proposed BoP as a “transitional administration with international legal personality that will set the framework and coordinate funding for the redevelopment of Gaza” (para. 2). Res. 2803 does not require the BoP to coordinate its policies or action with the UN-Global Alliance initiative or with other existing UN entities and processes in Palestine – except as to humanitarian assistance (para 3). Instead, it authorizes the BoP to establish its own operational entities with international legal personality as needed and to set up and oversee an “apolitical” committee of Palestinian technocrats as a future “transitional governance administration” – notably without PA participation (para. 4(B)(1)). Res. 2803 also gives the BoP authority to set up a US-proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF) of participating State troops to “deploy under unified command acceptable to the BoP” (para. 7). The ISF’s sensitive remit – including Hamas disarmament, civilian protection, humanitarian access and Israeli withdrawal – intensifies the risk of serious human rights violations, especially given the absence of UN guidance and later US insistence on ISF immunity.
Overall, Res. 2803 resembles an outsourced arrangement left almost entirely in the hands of a single Member State to deliver. It lacks the essential features of UN regulatory cooperation with Member States. Few safeguards exist for meaningful oversight that would ensure the BoP adheres to relevant UN principles and rules of international law or acts coherently with existing UN policies and action involving Palestine. First, the BoP reports on progress to the Council only every six months. Second, the BoP is required merely to conduct itself “in a manner consistent with relevant international legal principles” without specifying them, even by reference (paras 2, 3). Third, the ISF has only an obligation of conduct, not of result; it is *to use all necessary measures to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law” (para 7). Fourth, the fact that the PA has no role or voice in operationalizing the plan makes even more tenuous the Resolution’s statement that a “credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood may finally be in place once the PA “satisfactorily complet(es) its reform programs as outlined in various proposals. . .(and) Gaza redevelopment has advanced” (para 2, italics supplied). Fifth, safeguards for fiscal transparency and accountability are wholly absent; funds are merely to come from “voluntary contributions from donors and BoP funding vehicles and governments” (paras 4, 7). Sixth, no provision foresees UN transfer of expertise to the ISF despite the UN’s decades-long experience in applying relevant rules of international law in international peace operations.
Developments since the adoption of Res. 2803 underscore the stand-alone nature of the BoP and its resolve to consolidate power in the hands of its Chairman – despite the 27 states reported to be members of the Board. Announced in January 2026, the BoP Charter vests authority in the US Chairman over its decisions, subsidiary entities, and operations, including membership invitations, approval of Board and subsidiary organ decisions, and Charter amendments and interpretation– the Board has no overall binding authority of its own (art.3.1(f)). The Chairman also has exclusive power to issue BoP resolutions. In its first resolution, BOP/2026/1, the BoP granted itself sweeping new powers in Gaza, including “(a)ll transitional legislative and executive authority, emergency powers, and the administration of justice” (para 1.1), and broad legislative powers to the Office of the High Representative, another subsidiary entity created by the resolution. Ominously, the BoP resolution conditions access to humanitarian zones and controlled civilian-protection corridors on “appropriate eligibility standards” to be developed (paras 1.2). Other new entities announced by the resolution include the transitional governance committee of Palestinian technocrats and ISF (secs 6, 5) as well as a force to train local police, and an Independent Verification Committee. Of the new entities, none except the High Representative have begun substantive work at time of writing. Pledges from states for funding and donation of troops likewise appear slow – the BoP website reported eight donor pledges and five ISF troop donors in February 2026; one troop contributing state reportedly suspended its cooperation due to the US-Israel-Iran war. Israel’s non-compliance with the phases of the US-backed Plan has received only muted US pushback. Reflecting divisions, the UNSC debate on the BoP’s first six-month report reported no formal outcome nor did its quarterly review of the situation several months later.
Unsettled Lines of Legal Responsibility
Serious legal uncertainty surrounds the UN-BoP initiative – including the BoP’s identity under international and US law, who is responsible for harm attributable to its operations, and what legal rules would apply to resolve claims. Although Res. 2803 grants the BoP international legal personality, it is not clear the UNSC has such power and the relevant terms of the BoP Charter were not disclosed until nearly two months later. By its terms, the BoP Charter reads as an accord among States to advance mutually agreed aims solely through the controlling will of the US Chairman. This does not satisfy the test for presuming international legal personality under well-recognized principles of international law. That test requires 1) an entity created by States through treaty or other agreement that 2) has at least one organ capable of acting with a will of its own, distinctly from the will of its Member States. Because the BoP solely exercises the will of its US Chairman, it has no organ with a will of its own and cannot be presumed under international law to have international legal personality. Neither the UNSC grant of international legal personality to the BoP – assuming the Council has such a competence under the UN Charter – nor the BoP’s own grant of such personality to itself under its Charter (art. 6) would have any legal effect.
Indeed, the legal nature of the BoP Charter as a treaty is itself unsettled, at least in the US. The instrument was not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate as constitutionally required of treaties before ratification (US Const., Art II, Sec. 2, Clause 2). The US Administration’s unilateral attempts to declare it a treaty by official publication and to designate the BoP a public international organization by Executive Order do not appear to meet the requirements of applicable US Federal law. In June 2026, the US Government then announced its intention to transform the BoP into an international non-governmental organization (INGO) – reportedly to avoid US Congressional oversight – but no corresponding registration under domestic law can be found. In this situation of legal limbo, the US Congress has not approved any funding for the BoP’s operation and several pending US Senate bills seek to restrain or ban funding for the BoP.
Responsibility of the BoP. Assuming the BoP is not an international legal person, any legal capacity and privileges and immunities it may enjoy would appear to derive from its Member states – not from its reported attempts to grant itself immunities and privileges or from entities under its control that may recognize its immunity from suit such as the NCAG. States have inherent international legal personality and, to the extent recognized, diplomatic privileges and immunities when operating abroad. The BoP’s Member states may share legal responsibility for harm or losses attributable to the BoP’s collective operations jointly or separately subject to the applicable rules of international or domestic law. However, if the BoP becomes an INGO, its legal liability would likely be settled under the local law of its registration. See analogous reasoning (ch. 51) on multistakeholder initiatives.
Responsibility of the UN. The UN remains legally responsible for harm attributable to the UN-BoP initiative it authorized – even if Res. 2803 treats the BoP as a fully-outsourced arrangement. The UN’s failure to assess the consequences before taking such action in a situation of unlawful Israeli occupation, as required by the ICJ and its own UNSC Res. 2334 (above), can be seen as a breach of its duties under the Charter and international law. The UN is legally responsible to abide by peremptory norms of general international law and to take action to end such breaches – as well as to not recognise an unlawful situation as lawful or assist in maintaining such a situation. For more detail, see analysis of UN legal responsibility.
At a Crossroads: Options Ahead
The current situation of two competing action mandates in Palestine fails to meet the obligations of the UN and its Member states. Continuing serious erga omnes violations of international law are committed under Israeli occupation in Palestine – including human rights and humanitarian law breaches, as noted by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2024 in an advisory opinion that was later endorsed by the UNGA. There is a real danger that the divergent policy and operational orientations of the UNSC and UNGA initiatives may aggravate the already dire situation and further entrench the occupation, as an independent NGO recently reported. In such a context, the UN and its Member States have duties under the UN Charter and international law to take special care to avoid legal recognition of the unlawful Israeli occupation or to assist or aid it.
Given the serious risks of the two competing UN initiatives, the UN Secretary General (UNSG), UN member States, UNSC and UNGA should take action within their respective responsibilities to integrate sufficiently robust safeguards into the UN-BoP initiative. Those safeguards should reorient the BoP’s unique institutional features and working methods and its action plan to conform with international law and UN policy aims for Palestine. UN mechanisms to closely monitor BoP reporting and compliance with the revised terms of reference should also be agreed.
Options to consider include the following measures which can help align the two initiatives to act in accordance with UN Charter principles and international law, and in coordination with each other.
UN Secretary General: The UNSG should use his current reporting requirements to the UNGA and UNSC to engage a parallel dialogue in both forums on aligning all UN policy and operations in Palestine with the UN Charter and rules of the organization. At its 80th session, the UNGA issued a decision noting UNSC Res. 2803 without endorsing it, and requested the SG to report on implementation of UNSC Res. 2334, above, as its terms require (see UN Doc. A/80/L.16, para 10).
UN Member States: Concerted informal action among UN Member States can achieve momentum toward coordination of the two initiatives and corrective action. For example, UN Member States in the BoP and other UN Member states, including the US, should request the UN-BoP and UN-Global Alliance initiatives to engage in policy and operational exchanges to identify how to build a single approach aligned with UN governance rules and practices, and to report results in their respective reports to the upcoming UNGA and UNSC sessions. Notably, the BoP High Representative briefed a Global Alliance technical session in Italy in July 2026 in which a BoP adviser also participated.
The UN Security Council: The UNSC should issue a revised text replacing UNSC Res. 2803 by adding robust safeguards to ensure that all BoP entities, policies and programs operate in a manner consistent with relevant rules of international law and adequate accountability measures. For example, the text should:
- Require that all authority granted to the BoP and its subsidiary entities, including all powers subsequently declared by the BoP and its entities themselves, be exercised only under safeguards that ensure conformity with the UN Charter and international legal responsibilities of the UN and its Member States (see above).
- Require the BoP and all its subsidiary entities – including the ISF – to operate coherently with policies and operations of the broader UN governance sphere, and avoid competition or conflict with established UN aims, entities, and practices.
- Institute a system for the BoP to submit reports at least every 3 months to the Council (or to a delegated subsidiary committee) including on its efforts to implement the many common elements of the UNGA and BoP plans and on early warning systems to avoid conflict.
- Invite the UNSG to report periodically on implementation of the revised UNSC resolution, including in connection with implementation of Res. 2334 (see UNSG above), and invite the BoP to share an advance report with the SG to enable the SG’s report to present a full picture of UN system-wide treatment of the Palestinian question.
- Delete all inapplicable or unsubstantiated wording of Res. 2803 in the revised text, including on the grant of international legal personality, subject to a UN legal opinion on the matter.
- If the BoP becomes an INGO (see above), the text should adopt an oversight regime like that instituted in UNSC Res. 2664 (2022) for INGOs working in the context of humanitarian exemptions from sanctions regimes, including a mechanism for ongoing scrutiny of the risk that BoP and its entities are exploited for partisan purposes or used to aid illegal Israeli acts.
The UN General Assembly: The UNGA should reaffirm the points decided at its 80th session (see UN Doc. A/80/L.16) and also:
- Underscore the need for safeguards to be adopted urgently in the context of Res. 2803 to ensure conformity of the UN-authorized BoP action with UN Charter principles and policy and international law, and coherence with all UN action in Palestine, including the ongoing implementation of the New York Declaration.
- Request the SG to submit a report on the extent of coordination of the two initiatives to present a full picture of UN system-wide treatment of the Palestinian question and assess its implementation in line with the ICJ advisory opinion (above).
- Call on UN Member States which participate in the BoP to urge modifications to UNSC Res. 2803 that require BoP to act in conformity with the UN Charter and coherently with UN policies and action relating to Palestine, and consider suspending their BoP coordination until such safeguards are in place.
- Recommend that all Member States apply an embargo on the shipment to Israel of weapons-related materials or agree to impose economic sanctions until it links withdrawal of its forces to Hamas disarmament, and
- Recommend that international organizations, and in particular UN specialized agencies, urgently take similar steps as may be relevant to their mandates and within their powers.
The actions above can achieve the most effective results when implemented in coordination with each other. In particular, the Secretary-General and UN Member States can act immediately on their own initiative in the context of existing UN decisions to insist on UNSC revision to Res. 2803 and a robust UNGA response, as outlined above. Given sufficient resolve at this stage, the UN can pursue effective co-regulatory initiatives with other willing actors if all work together under terms that secure conduct in line with the UN Charter and coherence across the UN-wide governance sphere. For Palestine, such action is urgently needed to bring about peace and security “by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law” in line with the UN Charter (art. 1.1). The stakes for decisive and coordinated UN-wide action could hardly be higher.
Leave a Reply